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The role of exempt entities as government contractors highlights the complexity of exempt 
entities’ relationships with numerous government regulatory agencies administering diverse 
bodies of law at both the federal and state levels.  Exempt entities’ roles as government 
contractors can be neither understood nor regulated solely, or even primarily, in terms of their 
tax status.  Activities undertaken as government contractors and the way those activities are 
pursued may be consistent or inconsistent with federal and/or state requirements for exemption 
from taxation.  But, compliance with tax law requirements does not establish compliance with 
other bodies of law or establish that the entity can provide the expertise required to implement 
government programs or that its actual operations are consistent with its contractual 
obligations.  A regulatory framework for exempt entities that contract with federal and/or state 
governments must take account of both contract performance in substantive terms and 
continuing qualification for exemption from federal and state taxation.   
 
Government contracting means that government programs financed by taxpayer money 
are implemented by entities that are not themselves government agencies.  The emergence of 
what some analysts have called “government by contract” raises difficult and important issues 
of accountability.
1
 Accountability requires monitoring of contractors to prevent fraud and abuse 
and to ensure that government programs are being implemented as intended in the interests of 
the beneficiaries.  These issues are best understood as applying to all government contractors, 
without regard to their tax status.  At the same time, in part because there has been little 
attention to issues of accountability in the case of exempt entity contractors and in part because 
it is sometimes suggested that problems of accountability would be less pressing if exempt 
entities played  broader roles in the “contracting state,” directing some attention to issues of 
accountability and monitoring in the case of exempt entities as government contractors could 
advance the understanding of both tax exemption and government contracting.   
                                                          

  Professor of Law and Dean's Distinguished Scholar for the Profession, University of Miami School of Law. 
1 
Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FL. S. L. Rev. 155 (2000).  See also, JODY FREEMAN AND MARTHA 
MINOW, GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Harvard University Press, 
2009).        
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This paper focuses on three issues of accountability and monitoring applied to exempt 
entity contractors.  The first issue is what questions should be the focal points of monitoring and 
accountability.  The second issue is which agency or agencies might most effectively monitor 
exempt entities in their roles as government contractors.  The third issue is whether exemption is 
a proxy for a well-designed system of accountability monitoring.   
 
This paper suggests that the focal points of monitoring and accountability should be (i) 
prevention of fraud and abuse and (ii) ensuring that government programs are implemented in a 
manner that achieves the purposes of the programs being implemented.  With respect to the 
second issue, this paper takes the position that agencies with responsibility for implementing the 
substantive programs covered by the contract should generally play the leading roles in ensuring 
that taxpayers’ money is used effectively to implement government programs. These agencies 
have the relevant expertise with both the core requirements and the various modifications that 
such agencies may have negotiated in particular cases.  Effective monitoring of government 
contractors is inescapably grounded in expertise in the programs being implemented.  The third 
issues arises in the form of claims that exempt entities do not require monitoring beyond the 
scrutiny associated with maintaining their tax exempt status.  The weak form of this claim is that 
the IRS can provide adequate monitoring through its determination that the contractor continues 
to qualify for exempt status.  The strong form of this claim is that exempt entities can effectively 
monitor themselves because they are defined by their mission.  This paper expresses 
considerable reservations about the idea that tax exempt status can serve as an effective proxy 
for a monitoring with respect to either fraud and abuse or program implementation.  
 
The paper begins with a discussion of exempt entities as government contractors.  Part II 
discusses the concept of cooperative federalism as it relates to the implementation of government 
programs. Part III looks at issues of accountability and monitoring in two patterns of 
government contracting with exempt entities, the charity carveout pattern that reserves certain 
contracting opportunities to exempt entities and the conduit pattern in which a nonprofit, in 
some cases one that benefitted from a charity carveout, subcontracts with a taxable entity.  Part 
IV provides a brief conclusion that highlights issues to consider based on analyzing exempt 
entities as government contractors in a system of cooperative federalism.   
 
 
I. EXEMPT ENTITIES AS GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS 
 
This paper does not claim to present a comprehensive account of exempt entities as 
government contractors.  This is an area in which practice has developed far more fully than has 
either description or theory.  Nevertheless, important studies dating back to the Reagan years 
provide an important foundation for any work that is done moving forward.  Studies by 
Abramson and Salamon
2
 and more recently by Elizabeth Boris and her colleagues
3
 have 
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ALAN J. ABRAMSON & LESTER M. SALAMON, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND THE NEW FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
(Urban Institute Press, 1986). 
3 
Elizabeth T. Boris, Erwin de Leon, Katie L. Roeger, Milena Nikolova, Human Service Nonprofits and Government 
Collaboration: Findings from the 2010 National Survey of Nonprofit Government Contracting and Grants (Urban 
Institute 2010)[the “2010 Urban Institute Study”]. See also a companion report by the National Council of 
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established the importance of government contracting to both exempt entities and to the federal 
government.  Steven Rathgeb Smith and Michael Lipsky have established a foundation for future 
work on the impact of government contracting on the structure and operations of exempt 
entities.
4
  The 2010 Urban Institute Study
5
 and a report by a task force of distinguished New 
York lawyers and organization leaders working collaboratively with New York Attorney General 
Eric Schneiderman
6
 have highlighted important problems arising from failures of both federal 
and state government agencies to fulfill their obligations under their contracts with exempt 
entities.  Contracts are not signed and payments are not made in a timely manner, leaving exempt 
entities to finance government programs through what amounts to interest-free loans to 
government agencies.
7
  The fact that this paper does not focus on this range of failures by 
governments to fulfill their contractual obligations should not be construed as minimizing the 
importance of these issues.  
 
The 2010 Urban Institute Study focused on exempt entities that contract to implement 
human services programs, the area of government policy which has seen the greatest 
concentration of exempt entity contractors.  The Study found that exempt entity contractors tend 
to be large and to hold multiple contracts.  The Study has also documented a pattern of financial 
dependence of exempt entity contractors on government funding, although some exempt entity 
government contractors also engage in successfully in fund raising from private sources.  
Overall, the 2010 Urban Institute Study provides strong evidence that exempt entities are 
actively involved in extensive government contracting.   
 
This article suggests that questions relating to exempt entities’ performance as 
government contractors are important as well.  In the Introduction, this paper identified and 
briefly discussed three issues raised by concerns over monitoring for accountability.
8
  The first 
issue was the focal point of monitoring and accountability.  As suggested in the Introduction, 
monitoring for fraud and abuse will always be necessary.  Monitoring for fraud and abuse has 
been the central focus of most monitoring of most government contracts.
9
  It has also been the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Nonprofits, Cost, Complexification, and Crisis: Government’s Human Services Contracting “System” Hurts 
Everyone (2010). 
4 
STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH AND MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF 
CONTRACTING (Harvard University Press, 1993). 
5 
Boris et al, supra note 3. 
6 
Leadership Committee for Nonprofit Revitalization, Revitalizing Nonprofits, Renewing New York: Report to 
Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman (Feb. 16, 2012).  Contracting issues are discussed at 10-17.  This Report 
also focuses on governance issues, including recommendations for strengthening the capacity of boards to play 
strong, active, constructive roles in organization governance.  See id. at 23-33. 
7 
Small businesses, which are most commonly subcontractors under contracts in which large taxable entities are the 
prime contractor, express many of the same concerns. See 76 Fed. Reg. 61626-61632 (October 5, 2011)(discussion 
of rules requiring that prime contractors include small businesses as a target percentage of their subcontractors). 
8 
For a thoughtful discussion of the complexity of the concept of accountability, see Kevin P. Kearns, Accountability 
in the Nonprofit Sector, in LESTER M. SALAMON, ED., THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 587-615 (Brookings 
Institution Press, 2012, 2d ed.)(discussing performance accountability at 596-601). 
9 
OMB Circular A-122, Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations, 70 Fed. Reg. 51927-43 (Aug. 31, 2005).  
Circular A-122 provides that “[s]ome non-profit organizations, because of their size and nature of operations, can be 
considered to be similar to commercial concerns for purpose of applicability of cost principles.  Such non-profit 
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focus of IRS audits of exempt entities.
10
  This is necessary, but it is not sufficient.  Exempt 
organizations that contract with federal or state or local governments require monitoring to 
establish their record of program performance.  Both the taxpayer funded contracts and the 
taxpayer funded exemption from taxation can be defended only if and to the extent that exempt 
entities perform their contract obligations.  The same is true with respect to program 
performance monitoring and accountability with respect to taxable entities that are government 
contractors.   
 
Program performance monitoring, not just monitoring to prevent fraud and abuse, is 
important because exempt entities perform so many contracts in human services areas and, as a 
result, so often work with vulnerable people.  The care of vulnerable people imposes a moral 
responsibility on both the governments responsible for the programs and on the contractors who 
assist in implementing the programs because vulnerable people cannot protect themselves from 
abuse by those who are being paid with taxpayers’ money to care for them.  This is a solemn 
responsibility performed under difficult conditions.  Stories of abuse are told repeatedly but seem 
to have little impact.  Abuse of vulnerable persons may or may not correlate with evidence that 
the contractor engages in financial misdeeds as well.  The two elements of monitoring are 
directed to different types of problems.  Both are necessary.      
 
The second issue is what agencies should play the leading roles in monitoring the 
performance of government contractors.  This paper takes the position that the agencies that 
administer the programs, not the IRS, should take the lead.  This paper suggests that the IRS is 
not the proper agency to engage in monitoring for contract performance.  The case for making 
contract performance monitoring a responsibility of the IRS would be based on the argument that 
contract performance is part of the determination of whether the organizations is operating for an 
exempt purpose.  But, the organization might well be doing something that could be consistent 
with its exempt purpose without fulfilling the requirements of the particular contract that 
provided funding for the activity.  An exempt entity’s mission is not necessarily coterminous 
with its contract obligations.  The difference arises not because the organization is engaged in 
activities that are inconsistent with its exempt status but because its activities may not be 
consistent with its contractual obligations to implement a government program.  As the 
discussion in Part III of cooperative federalism indicates, federal programs are administered 
throughout a complex array of federal-state-local relationships that quite commonly involve 
programs modifications.  Contracts with particular contractors may incorporate additional 
program modifications, but it is not possible to say much about these without access to the 
contracts through which various programs are implemented.  Performance monitoring is difficult 
even without these variations. 
 
The third issue is whether exempt status could serve as a proxy for program performance 
monitoring.  This paper suggests that the idea that exempt entities are less likely to engage in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
organization shall operate under Federal cost principles applicable to commercial concerns.”  Id. at 31928.  
Appendix C to Circular A-122 provides of list of these organizations. Id. at 31943. 
10 
The IRS has devoted significant resources to implementing section 4958 dealing with excess benefit transactions 
and its relationship with the concepts of private benefit and inurement.  At times, it seems that attention to whether 
exempt entities are operating for an exempt purpose through activities consistent with that purpose receives less 
administrative attention to the cluster of private benefit doctrines. 
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activities that fall into the general category of fraud and abuse and more likely to excel in terms 
of program implementation is an assumption without any empirical basis.  Assumptions, often 
unarticulated and inchoate, that exempt entities provide greater skills and insight while requiring 
a lesser degree of monitoring with respect to either fraud and abuse or program performance, 
seem to be part of the rationale for special preferences for exempt entities in government 
contracting.  No one has developed a plausible argument for this approach, much less provided 
evidence supporting it.  Based on what is now known, exempt status does not mean that 
monitoring is unnecessary.  This claim could not be supported even if the organization’s mission 
aligned closely with the functions it would perform under the government contract.  Conflating 
the contract with assumptions about an organization’s mission and its track record in pursuing 
that mission effectively are matters for research, not a premise for defining contract terms.  To 
date, little such research has been done, in part because government programs are complex and 
because data about implementation are not available.  
 
Among the questions that remain unaddressed is whether exempt entities that are 
performing government contracts in fact have relevant prior experience in providing services in 
the same or similar areas.  While it is common to note that many of the areas now financed 
through government programs were once provided by exempt entities, these social histories say 
nothing about whether contemporary exempt entities that provide services under government 
contracts have any relevant experience.  These social histories also gloss over the differences 
between private charity and government programs.  One relevant distinction is the relationship to 
beneficiaries.  At least in an earlier era, charities could and did choose their beneficiaries.  
Government programs began with a very different premise that treated beneficiaries as citizens 
entitled to equal treatment if they qualified for participation in a government program.
11
  The 
change from government funding of entities that implement programs to funding of the 
beneficiaries in the form of vouchers has also brought marked changes from the historical 
premise that a charity chooses its beneficiaries.
12
  These differences are not simply a matter of 
who participates in programs and on what terms.  They are also a matter of how programs are 
designed and implemented.    
 
There is little information on what operational capabilities might be characteristic of 
exempt entities that seek government contracts and what characteristics might be correlated with 
successful contract performance.  For example, do exempt contractors with a previous track 
record in privately funded efforts have a better record of successfully implementing government 
contracts in the same policy areas? Or, does experience with the various systems of government 
contracting play a more important role?
13
  Does implementation improve over time?  What 
                                                          
11 
Karen M. Tani, Welfare & Rights: Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 
314)(2012)(detailing the use of the language of rights by the federal government during the New Deal to address 
issues of federalism and administrative capacity as public support programs shifted from a framework of local “poor 
laws” to a framework of federal and state programs).  
12 
For a useful overview, see Kirsten A. Gronbjerg & Lester M. Salamon, Devolution, Marketization, and the 
Changing Shape of Government-Nonprofit Relations, in LESTER M. SALAMON, ED., THE STATE OF NONPROFIT 
AMERICA 549-86 (Brookings Institution Press, 2012, 2d ed.). 
13
The complexity of government contracting requirements reflects statutory requirements and administrative 
requirements relating to matters of both substance and procedures.  Identifying these requirements is one of the main 
challenges of designing better systems for government contract implementation. 
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metrics are most useful in understanding contractor performance?  Is it possible to determine 
whether the operational characteristics of the contracting exempt entity or the characteristics of 
the government system of contracting are more important in shaping contract outcomes? 
 
Understanding these issues depends upon understanding what exempt entities are 
contracting to do.  Understanding what exempt entities are contracting to do requires analysis of 
contracts that exempt entities sign.  Issues of the program content, the procedural requirements, 
the beneficiaries intended to be served are all matters that should be specified in the contract.  
This information is essential for understanding if the claims of exempt entities to special 
expertise are warranted and for thinking about reasonable performance metrics.  Indeed, even the 
contracts themselves are not readily available, and research based on reading the contracts has 
not yet found its way into much of the literature on government programs and government 
contracting.         
 
These questions relating to what exempt entities have contracted to do are not answerable 
with current data. Data on government contracts are fragmented, dispersed, and incomplete.  
Both the government data base, USAspending (www.usaspending.gov) and the Pew Charitable 
Trusts database, Subsidyscope (www.subsidyscope.org) do not yet provide confidence that it is 
possible to look at the broad scope of government contracts or the broad range of exempt entities 
that may be engaged in government contracting.  It is heartening to learn that New York City has 
launched a new website, www.CheckbookNYC.com, much greater access to relevant 
information regarding city contracts.
14
 The site is intended to provide information to public 
officials, who no longer have to request information from the Mayor’s office, as well as to the 
public, including watchdog organizations.  The source code of this site, developed using open-
source software, will be made public for use by other governments.
15
 The Aspen Institute 
recently unveiled a study on the future of “big data” on exempt entities that will permit the kinds 
of research that are still out of reach do to the time and costs involved.
16
 
 
Better data available in more usable formats will not solve all of the issues involved in 
monitoring and accountability.  Exempt entities at times find performance monitoring and 
accountability inconsistent with their own sense of their missions.  Exempt entity contractors 
may view funding through a government contract as indistinguishable from funding through 
private contributions.   
 
This is not likely to be an analytically useful approach.  It risks neglecting issues of 
accountability and program performance monitoring that should be central in any system based 
                                                          
14 
David M. Halbfinger, New Site Makes It Easier to View City Spending, The New York Times, Jan. 22, 2013.  The 
Report to the New York Attorney General, supra note 6  had recommended this kind of web site for the state of New 
York, but it did not discuss public access. 
15 
David M. Halbfinger, New Site Makes It Easier to View City Spending, The New York Times, Jan. 22, 2013.   
16 
Beth Simone Noveck and Daniel L. Goroff, Information for Impact: Liberating Nonprofit Sector Data (The Aspen 
Institute, 2013).  The study was discussed at a conference entitled Liberating 990 Data: How “Big Data” on the 
Nonprofit Sector Can Spur Innovation, Knowledge and Accountability, held at the Aspen Institute in Washington, 
D.C. on January 31, 2013 and available on the Aspen Institute web site.  This program included remarks by Jonathan 
Greenblatt, Special Assistant to the President and Director on the Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation 
in the Domestic Policy Council. 
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on the use of taxpayer money.  It is perhaps worth remembering that Hansmann’s work is based 
on the importance of assuring donors that their contributions will be used for the intended 
purposes, not to enrich organization managers or other insiders.
17
 This theory has led to a focus 
on preventing private benefit, which has been an important development, but it has led some to 
conflate preventing fraud and abuse with implementing the organization’s mission.  The same 
risk is present in considering the roles of exempt entities as government contractors. 
 
These issues may soon become quite prominent among exempt organizations managers, 
advisers, and the government officials charged with implementing government programs.  On 
January 11, 2013, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari filed by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) in USAID v. Alliance for Open Society.
18
  The 
Court stated the question presented in the following terms: “Whether the United States 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, 22 U.S.C. 763(f), which 
requires an organization to have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking in 
order to receive federal funding to provide HIV and AIDS programs overseas, violates the First 
Amendment.”19 This case, in effect, raises issues of whether a government contract is a grant to 
an organization to pursue its own priorities or a contract with a government agency to implement 
a government program.  This case does not raise federalism issues, which make questions of 
monitoring and accountability even more complex.    
 
 
II. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM     
 
Any reference to federalism is likely to evoke strong reactions because federalism is both 
a structural principle of our constitutional system and a political ideology invoked for partisan 
advantage.  The operational consequence is that federalism is invoked to limit the federal 
government while serving as the framework for implementing government programs.  The 
concept of federalism as a check on federal government authority is more fully developed than is 
the concept of federalism as a framework for implementing government programs effectively.   
Making government programs work involves “cooperative federalism,” which is, of course, not 
always cooperative.
20
   
 
Cooperative federalism is an operational reality without a well-developed legal 
framework.
21
 Cooperative federalism relates primarily to program implementation.  This means 
                                                          
17 
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L. J. 835 (1980); Henry B. Hansmann, The 
Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from the Corporate Income Tax, 91 YALE L. J. 54 (1981). 
18 
USAID v. Alliance for Open Society, No. 12-10 cert. granted 1/11/2013.    
19 The case below is Alliance for Open Society Int’l. v. USAID, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), aff’g 570 F. Supp. 2d 
533 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  For a discussion of this case in the context of Spending Clause jurisprudence and the state 
action doctrine, see Frances R. Hill, Speaking Truth to the Power that Funds Them: A Jurisprudence of Association 
for Advocacy Organizations Financially Dependent on Government Grants and Contracts, 15 N.Y.U. J. Legis.& 
Pub. Pol. 363 (2012).               
20 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2008-2009). 
21 
For a contemporary approach to exploring the relationships germane to cooperative federalism, see Abbe R. 
Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health 
Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011-12).  For an analysis of the Roberts’ Courts uncertain jurisprudence 
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that cooperative federalism implicates administrative agencies exercising their authority to 
promulgate regulations and other guidance for program implementation.  Cooperative federalism 
also implicates the roles of agencies in monitoring the implementation of government programs 
by government contractors.  This is federalism at a granular level that takes account of 
monitoring to enhance program performance as well as to prevent fraud and abuse. 
 
The Supreme Court  invocation of federalism as a limitation on federal government 
authority has brought renewed interest in the structure of the administrative state and efforts to 
understand the administrative state though analytical frameworks that incorporate federalism as 
well as the roles of non-governmental actors.
22
  This has brought renewed attention to the 
Spending Clause
23
 and to the conditions that may be imposed by the federal government that 
finances state participation in government programs and also finances contracts with exempt 
entities to implement these programs.  
 
The Rehnquist Court, for all its concern with using federalism to limit federal 
government authority, nevertheless decided the foundational case in modern Spending Clause 
jurisprudence, South Dakota v. Dole, in a manner that gave the federal government broad latitude 
in imposing conditions on states that received benefits and participated in the administration of 
these programs.
24
  The Court in Dole gave the idea of “coercion” arising from the federal 
government’s ability to deny participation to states that did not agree to certain conditions only 
passing attention.
25
  The Roberts Court, in contrast, interpreted coercion far more centrally and 
expansively in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB)  by defining 
coercion to include state dependency on federal funding.
26
  To the Roberts Court federal funding 
was a trap in the guise of a benefit.
27
  
 
The Spending Clause is not the sole constitutional predicate applicable to cooperative 
federalism.  The Rehnquist Court took a far more restrictive approach to shared responsibility for 
implementing federal government programs in two decisions in the 1990s dealing with what has 
come to be called “commandeering.”  These cases are expressly focused on the role of state 
governments, concepts of state sovereignty, and the importance of limiting federal power.  These 
cases can be read through a variety of lenses.  While they certainly address the structure of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in the area of cooperative federalism, see Robert J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, 
and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-
Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L. J. 1599 (2011-2012). 
22 
Heather K. Gerken, Forward: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. Rev. 4 (2010-2011).    
23 
United States Constitution, Article I, § 8, cl.1. 
24 
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
25 Id. at 211.  The Court reasoned that “to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the 
law into endless difficulties.” Id. 
26 
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
27 
This interpretative twist allowed the Chief Justice to uphold the Affordable Care Act while claiming that he 
limited the reach of federal funding and thus of federal authority.  What this claim will mean for Spending Clause 
jurisprudence going forward is one of the important questions emerging from NFIB v. Sebelius.  For one view of the 
importance of the case on this point, see Gillian F. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. Rev. 83 
(2012).    
9 
 
federalism, they also seem to promote an ideological agenda that is perhaps reconcilable with the 
Constitution but is not compelled by the Constitution.   In New York v. United States the Court 
held that Congress could not require the states to enact or to implement federal government 
programs.
28
   Congress had enacted a statute requiring each state to dispose of radioactive waste 
generated in the state and setting forth both monetary incentives and sanctions to enforce 
compliance by the states.  The Court distinguished this case from cases subjecting states to 
generally applicable law to which both the states and private parties are subject.  The Court 
stated that its decision focused solely on a statute that required a state government to implement 
a federal government program.  The Court found that permitting the federal government to 
require the states to regulate undermined accountability by shifting the public perception of 
which government was primarily responsible for the regulation.
29
      
 
In a second case dealing with joint federal-state implementation of a federal government 
statute, the Court prohibited what it called “commandeering” state employees to play a role in 
implementing federal government programs.  In Printz v. United States, the Court held that the 
federal government lacked the authority to “command” state and local law enforcement officers 
to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers.
30
   
 
These two decisions by the Court suggest that federalism is based on clear distinctions 
between the federal government and state governments, with each autonomous in its own 
sphere.
31
 This concept of federalism may serve some purposes but it does not capture the 
operational complexity of cooperative federalism.  The question, which is largely beyond the 
scope of this paper, is whether the theory of federalism based on dual sovereigns can be 
reconciled with cooperative federalism or whether it imposes unworkable and ill-considered 
limits on state officials when they are operating in a system of cooperative federalism.   
 
Another constitutional predicate that shapes cooperative federalism is the Supremacy 
Clause, 
32
 which permits the federal government to preempt state laws in particular cases  The 
Supreme Court has decided hundreds of preemption cases without developing a overarching or 
synthesizing jurisprudence of preemption, although courts appear to support preemption in a 
broad range of cases.  For the purposes of this paper, it is important to note that preempting state 
law is not the same thing as cooperating in implementing federal law in cases where state law 
has been preempted.  Waivers of the requirements of federal law can be understood in at least 
                                                          
28 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
29 The Court elaborated on its reasoning in the following terms: “States are not mere political subdivisions of the 
United States.  State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal 
Government....The Constitution permits both the Federal Government and the States to enact legislation regarding 
the disposal of low level radioactive waste.  The Constitution enables the Federal Government to pre-empt state 
regulation contrary to federal interests, and it permits the Federal Government to hold out incentives to the States as 
a means of encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes. It does not, however, authorize Congress 
simply to direct the States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders.” 
30 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
31 For critiques of the “autonomy” model of federalism, see Bulman-Pozen and Gerken, supra note 20 and Heather 
K. Gerken, supra, note 22. 
32 
United States Constitution, Article VI, cl. 2. 
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some instances as alternatives to complete preemption of state programs even when federal law 
formally preempts state law.  The relationship between preemption and cooperative federalism 
remains to be explored.
33
   
 
This paper focuses on cooperative federalism as a framework for implementing 
government programs, including monitoring government contractors. This involves monitoring 
to prevent fraud and abuse and monitoring to ensure that government programs are implemented 
for the public benefit in a manner consistent with the choices made by government officials 
charged with designing and implementing these programs.  This is a process marked by 
contingency and adaptation at many points.  It is difficult, and perhaps unwise and unhelpful, to 
generalize about the utility or disutility of the multiple processes of adaptation that characterize 
the implementation of government programs.  This paper presents instead an inventory of 
patterns that define at least some of the settings in which cooperative federalism takes place.  
This inventory does not pretend to constitute a model or a theory of cooperative federalism.  It is 
more like a checklist meant to stimulate discussion of where cooperative federalism in program 
implementation takes place, how monitoring and accountability might develop in these settings, 
and what limits to cooperative federalism might either undermine or promote program 
effectiveness while safeguarding constitutional values.  The patterns of cooperative federalism 
include, but may not be limited to: 
 
(1) State programs implemented by state officials pursuant to state statutes 
and regulations, funded by state revenue for the benefit of the people of the state 
who are the intended beneficiaries of the program  
(2) Federal programs implemented by federal officials pursuant to federal 
statutes and regulations, funded by federal revenue for the benefit of the people of 
the United States who are the intended beneficiaries of the program 
(3) Federal programs implemented by federal and state officials pursuant to 
federal statutes and regulations, which may include conditions imposed on states 
that choose to participate in the programs, and including waivers obtained by 
individual states, for the benefit of the people of the United States in light of 
modifications applicable to the people of particular states that negotiated waivers 
with federal agencies responsible for implementing the program. 
(4) Federal officials shaping or interdicting state implementation of state 
programs based claims of conflicts with constitutional protections of 
beneficiaries’ rights 
(5) Federal officials preempting state implementation and enforcement of 
state programs based on federal claims of state interference with federal programs 
under the preemption doctrine. 
 
 The first two patterns are consistent with the idea of the federal and state governments as 
separate sovereigns, but this is an idea more attuned to ideological federalism than to the 
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granular federalism of program implementation.  These two patterns are more usefully seen as 
suggestions for research rather than as descriptions or conclusions.  The third pattern is 
consistent with the structure of many of the largest government programs, including the social 
service programs in which exempt entities are most likely to become involved in program 
implementation as government contractors. The fourth pattern raises the issue of what entities 
protect beneficiaries in what circumstances.  This issue is particularly important in human 
services programs dealing with vulnerable populations but it extend to issues like the denial of 
farm program benefits to African-American farmers by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  
This matter was addressed as a denial of constitutional guarantees of equal protection.  One of 
the issues arising in the contracting state is whether or in what circumstances contractors are 
treated as state actors.  In the same vein, contractors are often not subject to the same ethics rules 
as those applicable to government employees.  These issues deserve far more consideration than 
they are being given here or than they have been given in most discussions of government 
contracting.  The fifth pattern addresses questions of which law applies when both the federal 
government and one or more state governments have programs in place. The practice of granting 
waivers to states and the pattern of negotiating contract-based modifications of government 
programs with particular contractors makes the relationship between preemption and 
implementation, monitoring, and accountability much more complex than may commonly be 
appreciated.    
 
 This inventory of patterns of cooperative federalism raises questions about where exempt 
entities in their roles as government contractors fit in a regulatory framework based on 
cooperative federalism.  Like cooperative federalism, this issue does not lend itself to certainty or 
tidy charts purporting to account for all relevant dimensions of an issue. Whatever pattern of 
cooperative federalism may apply to particular programs, state revenue departments and the IRS 
as well as substantive agencies at both the federal and state levels are likely to be dealing with 
each other.
34
  Government programs are implemented with considerable flexibility that results in 
substantial modifications of programs.  The scope and nature of such modifications and their 
implications for government contracts for the provision of services has received little attention in 
discussions of cooperative federalism or in discussions of exempt entities as government 
contractors.  The relationship between program modifications and contract modifications has not 
been systematically explored.  This relationship raises questions about the terms of 
accountability of both the contractor and the government and their shared responsibility to 
ensuring that the benefits that are intended to result from the programs, and thus from the 
contract, in fact are provided.   
 
 
III. CHARITY CARVEOUTS AND CONTRACTING CONDUITS: CAN COOPERATIVE 
FEDERALISM IMPROVE MONITORING, ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTRACT 
PERFORMANCE? 
 
 Exempt organizations’ experiences as government contractors direct attention to two  
issues that have received little attention in the literature on government contracting.   The first 
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issue is described here as the issue of charity carveouts, a shorthand reference to a range of 
contracting preferences and relaxation of statutory and/or regulatory requirements in the case of 
exempt entities, particularly section 501(c)(3) public charities. The second issue is the role of 
exempt entities as conduits or accommodations parties in the contracting process.  A conduit or 
accommodation party secures the contract but does not perform the work specified in the 
contract, which is subcontracted to one or more taxable entities.  Subcontracting can be a means 
of enhancing contract performance.
35
  The issue here is how to reconcile subcontracting with 
taxable entities with the claims made in support of charity carveouts.  This issue relates directly 
to the larger question of accountability in government contracting, accountability for the use of 
taxpayer money to assist qualified participants in government programs.  These questions have 
been identified in the preceding sections of this article.  They are considered here in light of 
particular experiences based on publicly available information.  This article makes no claims that 
these discussions provide a complete description of the two experiences.  It also makes no claim 
that these two experiences described all, most, or even many government contracts involving 
exempt entities.  At the same time, there is no evidence to suggests that they are so atypical or 
uncommon that they can be treated as irrelevant to understanding the requisites of a regulatory 
regime for exempt entities’ contracting with federal and/or state governments. 
 
 A. Charity Carveouts: Credit Counseling 
 
 Credit counseling organizations offer education regarding personal finances to people to 
have encountered financial difficulties.  The IRS has since 1969 taken the position that credit 
counseling organizations that operate to educate the public can qualify for exemption as 
organizations described in section 501(c)(3).
36
  Revenue Ruling 69-441 stated that the 
organization would provide educational information to the public on “budgeting, buying 
practices, and the sound use of consumer credit through the use of films, speakers, and 
publications.”37 In addition, the organization would aid “low-income individuals and families 
who have financial problems by providing them with individual counseling and, if necessary, by 
establishing budget plans.”38 Under such budget plans, debtors would “voluntarily” make 
payments to the section 501(c)(3) organization, which would keep the funds in a trust account 
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and distribute them to creditors who had approved the payment plan.  These payment services 
were provided without charge to the debtor, and the full amount transferred by the debtor to the 
organization would be credited against the amount that each debtor owed to the participating 
creditor.  The organization did not make loans to debtors or negotiate loans on behalf of debtors.  
The organization was primarily funded by contributions from participating creditors, but 
creditors could participate without making contributions to the organization.  This ruling can be 
read as both defining limits and suggesting planning opportunities for those intent on abusing 
their exempt status.     
 
 In 1996 Congress enacted the Credit Organization Repair Act (CROA) to address serious 
abuses by credit repair organizations.
39
   Among the most serious abuses targeted by CROA were 
charging debtors seeking assistance mandatory fees or pressuring debtors to purchase debt 
modifications plans.  In addition, the organizations far too often failed to provide any meaningful 
assistance to debtors whom they had promised to assistance and from whom they had collected 
fees.     
  
 CROA defined credit repair organizations not to include “any nonprofit organization 
which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”40   
The result was a “charity carveout” from the requirements of the Act.  This carveout in CROA is 
consistent with the general jurisdictional principle in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, which limits Federal Trade Commission (FTC) jurisdiction over nonprofits, certain banks, 
insurance companies, and common carriers.
41
 These jurisdictional limits are based on the 
activities undertaken and, exception in the case of nonprofits, not solely on tax status. 
 
 The terms of the carveout raised the question of whether it applied to any organization 
that had a determination letter from the IRS recognizing it as exempt as an organization 
described in section 501(c)(3) even if was not operating in a manner consistent with its exempt 
status.  The leading case addressing this issue is Zimmerman v. Cambridge Credit Counseling,, 
in which the district court held that section 501(c)(3) status was sufficient to trigger the 
careveout,
42
 but the First Circuit reversed on grounds that the language of the carveout required 
that an entity subject to the carveout did not base nonprofit status solely on exemption as an 
organization described in section 501(c))(3).
43
  While this case prevented abusive section 
501(c)(3) organizations from relying on their exempt status as a defense against claims that they 
had violated CROA and made it clear that courts could look at the actual operation of 
organizations even if they had determination letters from the IRS recognizing their exempt 
status, these cases left much of the responsibility with the IRS since organizations that were not 
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recognized as section 501(c)(3) organizations had no claim that CROA did not apply to them.  
The result was that credit counseling organizations continued to seek exemption, which made the 
problem worse.  The result was an effort by the FTC, the IRS, and state authorities to stop the 
abuse of debtors by credit counseling organizations. 
 
 In simple numeric terms, the FTC brought twenty-three enforcement actions against debt 
relief companies.
44
 The IRS has examine or sought information from almost 800 credit 
counseling organizations.
45
 The IRS continues to deny exempt status to new organizations 
proposing to operate as credit counseling organizations and to revoke the exempt status of 
organizations that have been operating in a manner consistent with their exempt status.   
 
 This numerical comparison is not, of course, the whole story.  The FTC promulgated 
regulations relating to deceptive or abusive practices in the telemarketing of debt relief services 
in its 2010 Telemarketing Sales Rule,
46
 which was promulgated under the Telemarketing and 
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act.
47
  In addition, the broader effort against deceptive 
and abusive debt relief companies has depended critically on litigation by state officials pursuant 
to a range of state statutes.  The FTC lists 244 state enforcement actions and states that it is 
aware of 10 others.
48
 In the Preamble to the Telemarketing Sales Rule, the FTC described these 
state enforcement actions pursuant to state laws as “valuable” but also stated that “[t]he 
Commission agrees with the commenters who noted the advantages of a federal standard that is 
enforceable both by the FTC and the states, in particular the ability to obtain nationwide 
injunctive relief and consumer redress.”49  The FTC also noted that Congress had preserved 
some scope for federal preemption of state laws in this area.
50
  
 
 In 2006 Congress added section 501(q) to the Internal Revenue Code.
51
 Section 501(q) 
has been controversial, largely because of its reliance on governance mechanisms as an indicator 
of charitable purposes and as a method of preventing private benefit.  These governance 
requirements are not unlike the reliance on the involvement of members of the community in 
health care organization boards to establish the organization’s commitment to community 
benefit.  The larger question raised by section 501(q) is the efficacy of procedural requirements 
for monitoring performance.  Without data on outcomes for participants in the programs offered 
by the credit counseling organizations, it is difficult to draw any conclusions.  Yet, there is no 
consensus on metrics for participant outcomes and on the cost of engaging in these kinds of 
performance evaluations.  This paper has suggested that exempt entities should not be immune 
from accountability and monitoring and that the IRS is not the appropriate agency for such 
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activities.  Section 501(q) will be helpful for tax administration, but is unlikely to serve as an 
alternative to performance accountability. 
 
 The charity carveout has created a predicate for abuse of consumers, many of whom are 
people of limited means, by limiting the scope of FTC enforcement actions and imposing a 
regulatory burden on the IRS. When Congress limited the authority of the FTC, it unintentionally 
suggested an abusive planning tactic for bad actors seeking to profit from the economic troubles 
of others.  The IRS has spent untold hours of staff time revoking exempt status of credit 
counseling organizations or denying applications for recognition of exemption as a organization 
described in section 501(c)(3).
52
 
 
 B. Contracting Conduits: New Jersey Halfway Houses   
 
 Subcontracting can enhance contract performance, but that outcome does not happen 
without careful attention to the assumptions made and the kind of monitoring that may be the 
most effective in various types of programs.  The matter of the New Jersey halfway houses is a 
case in point.
53
   
 
 For reasons best known to itself, the state of New Jersey requires that state contracts for 
operating half-way houses be operated by section 501(c)(3) organizations.  Operating a halfway 
house requires skills that appear to be possessed by a very limited number of entities, all of 
which are taxable.  A taxable company that operates prisons and halfway houses in other states 
created a section 501(c)(3) for the express purpose of winning the contract with the state of New 
Jersey.
54
  The founders and officers of the charity were executives of the taxable company, and 
the taxable company was the charity’s sole member.  The charity contract with its  taxable parent 
and agreed to provide the entire amount received from the state to the taxable company, minus 
generous compensation for the charity’s officers, all of whom were also officers of the taxable 
parent. 
 
 The New Jersey halfway houses were models of how not to operate a halfway house.  
Inmates came and went at will, and violent inmates terrorized those who were less violent.  The 
guards feared the violent inmates and were unable or unwilling to protect the other inmates. At 
least one inmate was killed by other inmates.  Inmates committed serious crimes while absent 
from the halfway house. No training for a successful transition to life outside of prison was 
provided.  
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 The taxable company faced serious financial problems.  The charity had no resources 
other than the amount from the contract with the state.  There is no indication in the charity’s 
annual information returns that it engaged in active oversight of any kind of the performance of 
the taxable company with which it had subcontracted the work under the state contract.  This is 
scarcely surprising.  It is unlikely that the charity officials would have monitored their own 
performance in their capacities as executives of the subcontractor.     
 
 No agency of New Jersey government seems to have been able to monitor the 
performance problems at the halfway houses despite the serious problems of public safety and 
the safety inmates that characterized the daily operations.  The company president was a political 
supporter of the governor.  The New Jersey tax authorities did not terminate the charity’s exempt 
status under state law.  The IRS has not terminated the charity’s exempt status under federal tax 
law.  This is surprising not only because of the facts in this matter but also because the IRS in 
2012  issued a private letter ruling denying exempt status to a different organization created for 
the purpose of “applying for federal and state grants.”55  The IRS informed that organization that 
“you are operated primarily for a non-exempt purpose – to apply for and receive federal grant 
money for the benefit of LLC, a related for-profit entity.”56 There is no evidence that the IRS has 
applied a similar standard to the charity in the New Jersey halfway house case. 
 
 This may (or may not) be an extreme example of the downside of charity carveouts and 
the use of a charity as a conduit for winning a contract.  This example suggests that exempt 
status has little if anything to do with effective performance of government contracts.   
 
 The relevant question for administrators is whether the exempt entity has the capacity for 
monitoring the performance of the subcontractor.  It also suggests that charities that are simply 
alter egos of the subcontractor are unlikely to have this capacity.  Thus, it might be possible to 
develop best practices guidelines that would mandate, at the very least, additional scrutiny in 
cases of this kind of relationship between the conduit charity and the entity that will perform the 
duties specified in the contract.  Questions of the capacity for performing these duties and for 
monitoring the performance of the entity performing these duties are largely unrelated to tax 
status. 
 
 In this case, revocation of the exempt status of the conduit charity would seem to be 
important as a matter of the integrity of the law of exemption, but would be largely irrelevant to 
daily monitoring of contract compliance. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The roles played by charities as government contractors offer one perspective on the 
larger issue of charities’ relationships with government and with market entities.  Exempt entities 
are enmeshed in complex relationships with both governments and markets and should be 
understood in terms of these relationships.  Claims of distinctiveness as a basis for autonomy 
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from accountability cannot be reconciled with the multiple relationships through which exempt 
entities seek to achieve their exempt purposes.   
 
 Looking more closely at exempt entities in the contracting state could result in a number 
of benefits to both the exempt entity contractors and to government agencies.  The question is 
whether it will result in better service to the intended beneficiaries, especially among the most 
vulnerable members of our state and national communities.  Monitoring and accountability are 
important because beneficiaries must be the point of reference.  The Supreme Court’s ideological 
invocation of federalism in many instances makes the question of whether the federal or state 
government is responsible for implementing a program the central question. This is not the core 
question of either exempt status or cooperative federalism.  The point of accountability under a 
properly designed and implemented framework of cooperative federalism is for the government 
actors and the contractors that participate in program implementation to share responsibility for 
ensuring that taxpayers’ money is used for the designated purposes.  
 
 Without meaningful program monitoring, the program beneficiaries may not be properly 
served and the taxpayers’ money may not be properly used.  Monitoring based on tax status 
would not be plausibly considered in the case of taxable contractors, but it is claimed as plausible 
or logical in the case of exempt entity contractors.  This paper expresses substantial reservations 
about the idea that exempt entities bring to government contracting any special virtue that 
reduces the need for or appropriateness of government monitoring of their performance and 
considerable skepticism about conflating performance monitoring with tax compliance.  
 
 
 
 
